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Privacy in Public
JOEL R. REIDENBERG*
As government and private companies rapidly expand the infrastructure of surveillance from cameras on every street corner to facial
recognition for photographs on social media sites, privacy doctrines
built on seclusion are at odds with technological advances. This
essay addresses a key conceptual problem in U.S. privacy law identified by Justice Sotomayor in United States v. Jones and by Justice
Scalia in Kyllo v. United States; namely that technological capabilities undermine the meaning of the third-party doctrine and the
Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ standard.
The essay argues that the conceptual problem derives from the evolution of three stages of development in the public nature of personal
information, culminating in the ubiquitous transparency of citizens.
This ubiquitous transparency destroys any “reasonable expectation
of privacy.” The essay then argues that transparency without privacy
protection challenges the democratic values of public safety and fair
governance. To restore the balance and relocate privacy away from
the no longer workable “reasonable expectation” standard, the essay
argues for a new normative approach to privacy that would protect
observable activity where such activity is not “governance-related,”
but rather “private-regarding.” The essay concludes by showing that
this distinction is consistent with the First Amendment and draws on
established doctrines in tort law and First Amendment jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION

Data gathering drones at 17,500 feet,1 cell phone-based GPS trackers, wide distribution of facial recognition software,3 always-connected
Google Glass,4 and social network tools all demonstrate extraordinary
technical capabilities and collectively reflect that wide-scale deployment
of information technology creates a very transparent world. In this technologically mediated world, privacy law and society are in a state of
confusion about the appropriate treatment of publicly available personal
information. More than fifteen years ago, Helen Nissenbaum wrote of
‘privacy in public’ and argued “an adequate account of privacy should
neither neglect the nonintimate realm nor explicitly exclude it from consideration.”5 Her critique of the binary distinction between the public
and private realms is all the more relevant today in the face of now
ubiquitous surveillance and identifying technologies.
The transparency of personal information that is enabled by sophisticated online technologies undermines the meaning and value of longstanding American constitutional doctrines for privacy. In particular, the
Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard and
corresponding third-party doctrine seem anachronistic to serve their purpose of distinguishing the borders of privacy protection.
This essay looks at the state of confusion over privacy in public. In
a world of 24/7 data tracking, warehousing, and mining, technology has
transformed obscurity, accessibility, and transparency of personal information in ways that subvert the utility of the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” constitutional standard. This essay will first map out the key
constitutional doctrines that drive privacy law in the United States and
2

1. Rise of the Drones (PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2013), available at http://www.
pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/rise-of-the-drones.html.
2. Doug Adomatis, Using GPS for Tracking People, TRAVEL BY GPS, http://travelbygps.
com/articles/tracking.php (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (listing and describing different services).
3. Nicole Lee, First Taste of iLife ’09: iPhoto’s Face Recognition, CNET (Jan. 30, 2009,
3:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-10153818-1.html (millions of Facebook
members also use the “tag” feature to identify people in photographs that in turn enables Facebook
to automatically match those individuals in other photographs).
4. Glass, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/glass/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2014).
5. Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information
Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 208 (1997).
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will show that the transformation of information flows through three
stages of development, which fundamentally undermines the concept of
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Information that was once private
through obscurity now becomes technologically accessible. Information
that was once merely accessible now becomes transparent and receives
wide publicity. These parameter changes no longer fit within traditional
court jurisprudence on privacy. The essay then argues that constitutional
democracy depends on spheres of privacy in public to preserve public
safety and fair governance. To create those spheres of privacy in public,
the essay looks to a possible new demarcation line and proposes that
privacy protection be framed in terms of ‘governance-related’ and ‘nongovernance-related’ acts.
II.

THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
AND TECHNOLOGY

FOR

PRIVACY

The First and Fourth Amendments are the most significant constitutional drivers in U.S. privacy law.6 In broad terms, the First Amendment
protects against government interference in citizens’ rights to access and
convey information.7 More directly, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy against warrantless searches
and seizures.8 Of lesser magnitude for purposes of privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also intersects with privacy
and has been construed to protect a political association from having to
disclose its membership information.9
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence created the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that permeates the rhetoric of privacy even
in areas outside of constitutional law.10 The concept originates with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United States.11 Up until this decision, search and seizure law only protected individuals from the government breaking down their doors without a search warrant.12 In the Katz
case, however, the police, without a warrant, eavesdropped on a suspect
6. See, e.g., PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 44–50,
60–73 (1996).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Sorell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,
460–63 (1958).
10. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, BIG DATA
AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf
(referring to the perception of the continuous tracking of individuals for location based services as
“a potential affront to a widely accepted ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’”).
11. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
12. Id. at 352.
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who was speaking on a telephone inside a glass phone booth on a public
street corner.13 Even though the suspect’s activities were in a public
space and were completely visible, the Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment “protect[ed] people, not places.”14 Justice Harlan articulated the now famous formulation of a “twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable.’”15
Katz was a new interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that
moved away from defining privacy in terms of physical trespass to framing privacy in terms of expectations.16 Following the Katz interpretation
of privacy, the Fourth Amendment extended beyond physical boundaries
setting the stage for much of the current instability concerning the scope
of privacy for actions that occur in public.
Under Katz and its progeny, in order for there to be “privacy,” an
individual must have an expectation of privacy that society will recognize as legitimate.17 During the two decades following the Katz decision,
the Court tried to figure out how the accessibility of information in public places related to the expectation of privacy. The Court’s inquiry into
whether individuals have privacy in public gave rise to the “third-party”
and “plain-view” doctrines. The jurisprudence started down this path in
United States v. Miller when the Court ruled that the drawer of a check
had no privacy interest in the transaction information contained on the
check because the check was disclosed to many third parties through the
banking system.18 A few years later, the Supreme Court likewise ruled
that individuals had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone
numbers they dialed, as these numbers were necessarily disclosed to the
phone company so that the call could be routed.19 In a similar vein, the
Supreme Court held in California v. Ciraolo that the observation of a
marijuana field from a low flying airplane did not require a warrant.20
The field, though on private property shielded from the public street,
was considered to be in “plain view” or, in other words, publicly avail13. Id.
14. Id. at 351.
15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 353.
17. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.
405, 409–10 (2005); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–12 (1986); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–46 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442
(1976).
18. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
19. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–46.
20. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
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able because it could be seen from an aircraft flying in public air
space.21 The property owners, thus, had no reasonable expectation of
privacy.22
The Court later reflected on technology-assisted viewing in Kyllo v.
United States and struck down the use of a heat sensor to detect marijuana cultivation inside a garage.23 Justice Scalia said that when “the
government uses a device that is not in general public use . . . [then it is]
unreasonable without a warrant.”24 The Court distinguished the use of
the heat sensor from a flyover, the method used in California v. Ciraolo,
by stating that although the heat was emanating into public space, the
public heat signature was detected by using a technology that was not
“in general public use.”25 Because the heat signature was not generally
accessible to the public, unlike air travel, the government needed a warrant as the heat signature was “private” information.26
As a result of these decisions, the meaning of “reasonable expectation of privacy” currently turns on whether and how technology is commercially deployed. The rapid development and distribution of tracking
technologies used in daily life, ranging from social media infrastructure
to cameras recording movements through public and private spaces,
quite clearly impact whether activities will be treated as publicly available and whether anyone can reasonably expect privacy in their personal
information.27
With the Court’s definition of privacy only extending to that which
we should reasonably expect to be private, mapping the third-party and
plain-view doctrines to transaction records leaves little space for privacy. Technological evolution eviscerates any boundary of what we can
reasonably expect to be private by upending social expectations with the
deployment of personal technologies such as smartphones.28 A few simple examples illustrate how information technology can be disruptive of
social expectations. In 2001, the use of facial recognition scanning for
every football fan entering the Super Bowl in Miami caused a stir.29
21. Id. at 213–14. The “plain-view” doctrine creates an exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement for seizures. The doctrine relates to privacy expectations because of the
consequences it assigns to publicly available information.
22. Id. at 214.
23. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 33–34, 40.
26. Id.
27. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2002) (Solove argues that the doctrine fails in the face of
“digital dossiers,” or aggregations of data that act as digital biographies).
28. Id. at 1085–1086.
29. See Declan McCullagh, Call it Super Bowl Face Scan I, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2001), http://
www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2001/02/41571.
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Mass scale public surveillance devices were not in general use at that
time.30 But today, facial recognition software is routinely embedded in
portable computing devices, such as the face and optic recognition features in Apple’s iPhoto software and the Samsung Galaxy S4 smart
phone.31 Personal drones cost less than $300 on Amazon, can stream
live high-definition (“HD”) video feeds to a smartphone or tablet,32 and
are now in general public use.33 Cell phone routing requirements, as well
as smartphone GPS functionality, mean that multiple parties (mobile
phone providers, application providers, and cell tower owners, to name a
few) each have tracking information on mobile phone users’ movements.34 Moreover, cell phones serve as small pervasive recording
devices.35 By December 2012, the number of active devices in the
United States exceeded the national population.36
In light of these ubiquitous technologies, the limits of Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Kyllo become apparent. The Big Data
project to constantly track and collect personal information37 means
there can be no such thing as an expectation of privacy. Information that
is in plain view or publicly available, coupled with the third-party doctrine in this context, translates to no reasonable expectation of privacy in
data. In the face of “ambient surveillance,”38 how can any notion of a
reasonable expectation of privacy survive? Even the notion that a boundary can be drawn around whether technology to assist discovering infor30. Id.
31. See iPhoto ‘11: Faces Overview, APPLE.COM, http://support.apple.com/kb/PH2369 (last
modified Apr. 23, 2013) (describing the Faces feature); Agam Shah, Inside Samsung Galaxy S4’s
Face and Eye-Tracking Technology, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 15, 2013, 3:06 AM), http://www.
computerworld.com/s/article/9237622/Inside_Samsung_Galaxy_S4_s_face_and_eye_tracking_
technology.
32. Parrot AR.Drone 2.0 Quadricopter, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Parrot-ARDrone-Quadricopter-Controlled-Android/dp/B007HZLLOK (last visited Aug. 27, 2014) (the
device can be controlled by an iPhone, iPad, or Android device and can stream high-definition
video to those devices).
33. CBS 2 Investigation: Beware of Domestic Drones—The High-Flying Spies, CBS NEW
YORK (May 1, 2013, 11:04 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/05/01/cbs-2-investigationbeware-of-domestic-drones-the-high-flying-spies/.
34. See, e.g., Surveillance Self-Defense: Mobile Devices, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://ssd.eff.org/tech/mobile (last visited June 19, 2014).
35. Wendy Ruderman, Is Someone Recording This? It’s Harder to Find Out, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/nyregion/secret-recording-grows-safer-asthe-wire-grows-tinier.html.
36. Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA.ORG, http://www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/howwireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey (last updated June 2014).
37. Kenneth Cukier, Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.
economist.com/node/15557443.
38. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory,
Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 347–54 (2011) (noting “ambient”
image capture and the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy for tort law).
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mation is in general use or not in general use becomes irrelevant.
Alternate data sources abound. For instance, just as grow lamps produce
heat signatures that could not be obtained by heat sensors without a warrant, the lamps will also generate signature electrical use patterns.39 As it
turned out, the police in Kyllo had also obtained electric use records and
matched them to grow lamp patterns.40 Under the third-party doctrine,
the police did not need a warrant to obtain this revealing information
from the power company.
But this technological disruption of expectations is only part of the
story. In other contexts, the Supreme Court approached information privacy differently. Rather than focus on the individual’s expectation or
“plain view,” the Court focused on how technologically mediated access
to information impacts the individual. For example, in U.S. Department
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court
denied access to a rap sheet, even though each item on the rap sheet was
publicly available information.41 The Court even upheld, against a First
Amendment challenge, a purpose restriction limiting why someone
could gain access to government-held personal information and restricting how that information could be used.42 These issues of information
access and use are also put in play by technological developments.
III.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF INFORMATION FLOWS
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION

AND

The evolution of information technology has transformed data
flows in ways that expose the fault lines of the constitutional approach to
privacy protection. Information technologies have propelled this transformation of information flows through three stages of development: A)
the obscurity of information available to the public; B) the accessibility
of information to the public; and C) the transparency and publicity of
information to the public. The movement through these stages creates an
important transformation of privacy in public.

39. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NISTIR 7628,
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBER SECURITY: VOL. 2, PRIVACY AND THE SMART GRID 6 (2010),
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/ir7628/nistir-7628_vol2.pdf (smart grid
technology “can recognize unique electric signatures for consumer electronics and appliances and
develop detailed, time-stamped activity reports within personal dwellings”).
40. United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Or. 1992) (these facts were discussed at
the trial court level; the Supreme Court only focused on the heat sensor technology).
41. 489 U.S. 749, 753, 780 (1989) (denying access to a rap sheet even though each element
on the sheet was public information).
42. L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g, 528 U.S. 32, 34, 40 (1999).
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Stage 1: Obscurity and Privacy Expectations

At the first stage, before the ubiquitous deployment of information
technologies, obscurity of information provided an important degree of
privacy protection.43 As a practical matter, data that was inaccessible
was private, and the public could have expectations of actual privacy,
even if theoretically the information was available for scrutiny.44 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones acknowledged this reality: “In
the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither
constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional surveillance for
any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore rarely
undertaken.”45
While acknowledging the intrinsic privacy of obscure public
records, the Court’s view is inherently contradictory: if privacy were
protected as a practical matter, then individuals had an expectation that
should have been protected as a constitutional matter. In other words,
obscurity plays a normative role in shaping social expectations of privacy that the Court would then have to protect.
B. Stage 2: Accessibility and Privacy Expectations
As technology develops, obscurity is eroded through the accessibility of personal information, and constitutional doctrine has a death struggle with expectations. The struggle derives first from the accessibility of
personal information of anyone in public, or put another way, from the
modern loss of anonymity in public. Before digital cameras could capture high-resolution images at great distances and computer algorithms
could match photos with identities, individuals walking through public
places, like Grand Central Terminal in New York City, at rush hour,
would be anonymous in a crowd.46 This anonymity existed even though
the individuals were in plain view. Now, with surveillance cameras on
43. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2013).
44. Id. at 9 (“online obscurity is a general expectation”).
45. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Facial Scanning Is Making Gains in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2013, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/21/us/facial-scanning-is-making-gains-insurveillance.html (describing the ability to link public video cameras with facial scanning); Sean
Gallager, Flying RoboCop is a “Riot Control” Octocopter with Guns and Lasers, ARS TECHNICA
(June 19, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/flying-robocop-is-a-riotcontrol-octocopter-with-guns-and-lasers/ (“The Skunk is also equipped with FLIR thermal
infrared and HD color cameras to capture the identity of those in a crowd to be controlled.”);
Michael B. Kelley, The FBI’s Nationwide Facial Recognition System Ends Anonymity as We
Know It, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 10, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-fbisnationwide-facial-recognition-system-2012-9 (reporting on FBI’s $1 Billion Next Generation
Identification program to deploy facial recognition throughout the U.S.).
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every building and street corner, and with digital facial recognition capabilities in wide use on laptops and on social networks like Facebook,47
society can no longer claim any expectation of anonymity in crowds.
Alessandro Acquisti at Carnegie Mellon has even demonstrated on
national television that an image of an unknown student walking across
a college campus can readily be used to identify the individual, scrape
personal information from the Internet, and reverse engineer the student’s social security number.48
The ubiquity of image-capture devices in private hands also means
that individuals lose an expectation of privacy in non-public places.
Anyone in a non-public place now has the capacity to capture image and
audio on a pocket smartphone and make those recordings accessible to
the world through popular services such as YouTube and Tumblr. One
company, Redpepper, is deploying cameras in places like bars and hotels
in order to track those who patronize the establishments and has a partnership with Facebook to offer identified individuals special deals.49 The
system works by matching patrons’ faces against the Facebook profiles
of those who opted into the system.50 However, even if an individual
does not opt into the scanning, the technology is in place, and the establishment owner and Facebook can each know the name of every identified patron. Since this identification is made to a third party, the police
would not need a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to know who
was in the establishment.51 In other words, what might have been a previously obscure, anonymous presence in a private place becomes an
identified act.
The constant tracking of individuals’ movements, whether in physical space via pocket tracking devices (cell phones) or on the Internet via
transaction logging, makes personal information widely accessible. Multiple parties, such as telecommunications service providers, websites,
and transaction partners, to name a few, have access to the reams of
daily data. The same is now true of government-held public records. The
digitization of these records, like real property records, that once existed
only in musty basements of government buildings now makes them
widely accessible.52
47. See Lee, supra note 3.
48. “Big Brother” Is Big Business?, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-18560_162-57584887/big-brother-is-big-business/.
49. Sharon Gaudin, Can Facedeals Overcome ‘Creepy’ Factor?, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 23,
2012, 3:13 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230548/Can_Facedeals_overcome_
creepy_factor.
50. Id.
51. The third-party doctrine would apply to the identification of the individuals in the bar. See
supra Part II.
52. See, e.g., Judicial Conference Privacy Subcommittee, Conference on Privacy and Internet

R
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The Supreme Court recognized that the broad accessibility of personal information creates a qualitative shift, but it could not frame the
contours. In Whalen v. Roe, the Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a New York state database program that required
pharmacies to report physicians’ narcotic prescriptions.53 Justice Brennan wrote that “[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse,”54 and Justice Stevens
noted that “[w]e are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computer data
banks.”55 The case was pre-Internet, and yet the Court struggled with the
impact of digitization and accessibility on its conceptualization of
privacy.
C. Stage 3: Transparency and Privacy Expectations
Deployed technologies move the information flows beyond accessibility to transparency and its attendant publicity.56 Collections of accessible personal information become transparent to the world through
search technologies, push notification technologies, blogs, and hosting.
As this occurs, the utility of the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard diminishes. Justice Sotomayor in her
concurrence in United States v. Jones explicitly recognized this problem.
She wrote: “[T]his approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks.”57
Justice Sotomayor recognized that new social norms of sharing
information on social networking sites are incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment standard. Nonetheless, the Court responded to the challenge
with a narrow decision on technical grounds. The police had put a physical device on the defendant’s car without a valid warrant to monitor the
defendant’s movements on public streets over a period of time.58 The
Court determined that the police had committed a physical trespass on
the defendant’s property, like breaking into a home,59 and avoided the
real issue of information aggregations and transparency.
Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 4–6 (statement of Joel R. Reidenberg).
53. 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977).
54. Id. at 607.
55. Id. at 605.
56. See generally Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 43, at 32–40. In their paper reflecting on a
model for online obscurity, Hartzog and Stutzman’s factors to determine if information is obscure
map more closely to what I address here as accessibility and transparency of personal information.
57. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 948.
59. Id. at 949.
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In another much earlier context, however, the Supreme Court
articulated that the transparency of citizens’ personal information due to
the ease of computer access to public records raised privacy concerns
that were otherwise absent when those records were obscure and that
computerized information warranted protection. In a landmark Freedom
of Information Act case, the Court denied journalists access to police
department rap sheets listing all of a person’s arrests, even though each
data point was public information.60 The Court stated, “there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations
throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single
clearinghouse of information.”61
In deciding whether the Freedom of Information Act’s privacy
exemption permitted the police to withhold the data, the Court’s analysis
relied on the Fourth Amendment concept of a “reasonable expectation of
privacy.”62 The Court essentially said that when discrete publicly available information was complied together and made transparent, it had a
qualitatively different privacy character than the previously obscure, distinct parts.63
Similarly, the Supreme Court grappled with the expectations of privacy when New York state mandated that the narcotic prescription
records of physicians be made transparent to specific state officials
through a state database.64 The New York statute was challenged as a
Fourteenth Amendment violation, but the Court permitted the creation of
the database where strict limits were placed by the state on access to the
data so that the data would not be widely transparent.65
In the First Amendment context, two cases, one recent and one
from fourteen years ago, struggled with the transparency and publicity
of personal information arising in public contexts. Four years ago, in
Doe v. Reed, members of a group in Washington state sought to block
the disclosure of their names as signatories on a petition to require a
statewide ballot referendum.66 The petitioners’ concern was that the
60. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753
(1989).
61. Id. at 764.
62. Id. at 780 (stating that a “third party’s request for law enforcement records or information
about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s privacy”).
63. Id. at 764.
64. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–604 (1977) (discussing whether the statute “invades a
constitutionally protected ‘zone of privacy’ and holding that the patient-identification
requirements of the statute do not invade “any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
65. Id.
66. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010).
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transparency and resulting publicity to their identities would cause them
harm because of the unpopularity of their views.67 The Court, however,
upheld the disclosure of names and thus required that the personal information generated in the context of the ballot petition had to be transparent.68 Yet previously, the Supreme Court was more sympathetic to
blocking the transparency of arrestees’ records. In Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing, the government released
arrestee records only for limited uses by recipients.69 The use limitations
were challenged on First Amendment grounds, and the Court held that
the limitations on transparency (i.e. banning use for any purpose) were
constitutionally permissible where the government was not compelled to
disclose any data in the first instance.70
These last decisions are, in effect, movements away from reasonable expectations of privacy and toward articulating appropriate levels
of transparency to personal information gathered publicly. The technology-driven transformation of information flows thus calls into question
how society can deal with the privacy of personal information emanating
from the public sphere.
IV.

THE DEMOCRATIC NECESSITY

FOR

PRIVACY

IN

PUBLIC

Privacy is fundamental to constitutional democracy affecting a citizen’s ability to participate in deliberative democracy and to engage in
robust governing dialogues.71 The transparency of personal information
has a very significant impact on our constitutional democracy in two
ways. First, and counterintuitively, transparency threatens constitutional
democracy on both an individual and institutional level. But, second,
transparency can also be a mixed benefit for the preservation of democratic values.
A.

The Transparency Threat to Democratic Values

The Declaration of Independence articulates well that the function
of constitutional democracy is the assurance of the inalienable rights to
“life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”72 But, transparency of personal information undermines those key values.
67. Id. at 2820.
68. Id. at 2821.
69. 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999).
70. Id. at 39–41.
71. See, e.g., Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403–04 (2008)
(arguing that privacy is essential to democratic values of free thought and expression); Paul M.
Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1647 (1999) (arguing
that privacy standards are necessary for deliberative democracy).
72. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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Privacy protects citizens from violence. Two online data mash-ups
illustrate the risk of harm from the lack of privacy in public. The now
defunct app “Girls Around Me” scraped pictures of women that were
publicly available in real-time on the Internet from social networking
sites and displayed those pictures on a smartphone map based on the
geolocation tags embedded in the women’s photos.73 The app was perfect for stalking unsuspecting women. Similarly, another app, PleaseRobMe.com was a mash-up that used social media status updates to
show maps in real time where vacant apartments were likely located.74
The app would scrape the Internet for social network postings such as:
“I’m going to school today” or “I’m at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference.”75 The app would search to match the poster’s identity with
available information on the individual’s place of residence—all of
which are publicly observable data points. The point of the developers
was quite clear: to illustrate the great risks of transparency and publicity
of information combinations.76
Privacy also enables citizens to hold and advocate unpopular ideas.
Anonymous speech is protected in the United States.77 Voting records
are held confidential for this very reason.78 Anonymity in public is a
critical feature for an open society.79
Institutionally, privacy is essential to the integrity of the jury system. The transparency of personal information online takes juror
research out of the structure and judicial supervision out of the voir dire
process. Similarly, jurors tweeting and judges friending and posting on
Facebook can raise significant issues for the public’s confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system.80
73. See Nick Bilton, Girls Around Me: An App Takes Creepy to a New Level, N.Y. TIMES
BITS (Mar. 30, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/girls-around-me-iosapp-takes-creepy-to-a-new-level/.
74. See, e.g., Andrew Hough, Please Rob Me Website Causes Fury for ‘Telling Burglars
When Twitter Users are Not Home’, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 19 2010, 7:30 AM), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/technology/twitter/7266120/Please-Rob-Me-website-tells-burglars-when-Twitterusers-are-not-home.html; Ryan Kim, PleaseRobMe.com Posts When You’re Not at Home,
SFGATE (Feb. 18, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/PleaseRobMe-com-postswhen-you-re-not-at-home-3272742.php.
75. Kim, supra note 74.
76. Id.
77. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
78. See James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 927, 942–43 (2011).
79. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 231–44 (2002).
80. See Joe Palazzolo, Arkansas Defendant Saved by the Tweet, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Dec. 8,
2011, 4:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/08/arkansas-defendant-saved-by-the-tweet/
(conviction overturned because juror tweeted during trial); see also Alex Ginsberg, SI Judge is
Red ‘Faced’, N.Y. POST (Oct. 15, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/staten_

R
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B. The Transparency Support for Democratic Values
While publicity of personal information can threaten society’s
claims to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” transparency can
also be a tool to strengthen constitutional democracy. Transparency can
make public officials perform their jobs better and be more accountable
to the public. The accessibility of personal information helps law
enforcement address crime and national security concerns. So just as the
transparency of personal information can be a safety threat for individuals, it can also be a tool for government acting in its capacity of protecting citizens.
Publicity of personal information can also preserve democracy by
supporting oversight of government. For example, the website OpenSecrets.org aggregates publicly filed records and publicizes campaign
donations and politicians’ voting histories. This enables citizens to see
who is financing elected officials and how those officials may be influenced in their voting.
Similarly, the ubiquity of image-capture devices may be used to
film police in action. This can provide a powerful public, visual check
on any abuses of police power. Police have been disciplined for abuses
based on citizen videos.81 At the same time, police departments resist
this form of oversight82 and have actually charged people with crimes
for filming police engaged in making arrests.83 Courts by and large have
ruled that filming police is constitutionally protected as an oversight
function of the public.84 The public can film the police so long as they
are not impeding the officers’ performance of their police functions.85
Public image capture, however, may also cross a fine line into vigilantism. For example, the Blue Servo network is a controversial network
of cameras set up so that “[c]itizens can sign up as Virtual Texas DeputiesSM to participate in border surveillance through this social network.”86 And Reddit was infamously used to falsely accuse a missing
Brown University student of bombing the Boston Marathon.87
island/item_1TCZaxBoS2p5oOyES11jPN (judge disciplined for friending lawyers who were
about to appear before him on Facebook).
81. See, e.g., Police Officers Pulled Off Street After YouTube Video Surfaces, ABC 7
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Jan. 26, 2013, 6:56 PM), http://7online.com/archive/8969480/.
82. Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
83. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
84. Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333.
85. Glik, 655 F.3d at 84.
86. About BlueServo, BLUESERVO, https://web.archive.org/web/20130626055913/http://www.
blueservo.net/about.php (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) (accessed by searching for BlueServo in the
Internet Archive index).
87. Bill Briggs & Bob Sullivan, Missing Brown University Student’s Family Dragged into
Virally Fueled False Accusation in Boston, NBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://usnews.
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In short, a lack of privacy for information observed in public areas
both threatens and preserves the key values of a constitutional
democracy.
V.

FINDING “PRIVACY

IN

PUBLIC”

The recreation of privacy in public suggests that the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” standard needs to give way to a standard that
takes into consideration a variant of what Helen Nissenbaum coins as
“contextual integrity.”88
The variant is to examine the generation of personal information in
order to distinguish between observable acts that are “non-public,” or
private-regarding, and those that are of public significance, or “governance-related.”89 The distinction means that the nature of the act places
information into the true public sphere rather than the observability of
the act. This distinction already has a basis in constitutional thought. In
Florida Star v. B.J.F., a newspaper published the name of a rape victim
in violation of Florida law.90 The Court held that the First Amendment
protected the newspaper’s publication because the victim’s name was
obtained lawfully and because the matter (a publicized criminal proceeding) was of public significance.91 Applying a public significance filter to
the transparency and publicity of personal information seems promising
as a means to restore privacy in public. Drawing the distinction is thus
an important task.
A.

Private-Regarding Acts

The Katz decision provides a useful starting point to identify “private”-regarding acts. Even though the phone call in that case took place
in a publicly observable place on a street corner,92 one could hardly
argue that the action of a person making a call in a phone booth is one of
“public significance” or directed toward the public. The activity in Katz
would be classified as private, and the outcome of the case would be the
same. Similarly, the New York state prescription drug database that was
nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/19/17826915-missing-brown-university-students-family-draggedinto-virally-fueled-false-accusation-in-boston.
88. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 127 (Stanford Univ. Press 2010). See
generally Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643 (2013)
(arguing that Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity should be applied to Fourth Amendment
analysis).
89. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 88, at 127–55.
90. 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
91. Id. at 541.
92. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
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addressed in Whalen v. Roe93 could not have a privacy right under the
traditional “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard because the
doctors’ prescription records were always disclosed to third parties, the
pharmacies.94 The doctors’ prescription records, though, are not of public significance. Rather, the medical interaction was a private interaction
among the patient, doctor, and pharmacist. As such, Whalen would
likely have a different result.
B. Governance-Related Acts
To qualify as a “governance act,” the action or activity needs to
have an inherent public significance. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
foreshadowed this approach when they first argued that privacy should
not attach to matters of “public or general interest” or to matters that
“have no legitimate connection to fitness for public office.”95 An individual’s subjective intent does not thus determine whether an observable
activity in a public place is “governance-related.” Rather, the social
norm of public significance and public interest set the boundaries of
“governance-related” information. This public significance test parallels
similar distinctions in tort law. Defamation law distinguishes between
public and private figures on the basis of public interest.96 Likewise, the
tort for publication of private facts is unavailable when the private facts
are of public importance.97
Contrast Katz and Whalen, with Doe v. Reed.98 In the Reed case, a
group of Washington state citizens signed a petition to hold a referendum seeking to overturn a state statute expanding civil rights for samesex domestic partners.99 The signatories to the petition sought to block
the disclosure of their names to the proponents of same-sex rights.100
The act of signing the petition appears quite clearly as a publicly significant act—a governance act. The signatories are engaging in a collective
governance act by fulfilling the prerequisites for a plebiscite—securing
a certain number of signatures of qualified voters. Further, the signatories are also petitioning for an act of government—a ballot question for
the citizens to supplant the legislature’s decision. These activities, collectively, would be characterized as a “governance act.” Under the gov93. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977).
94. Id.
95. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214,
216 (1890).
96. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272–73 (1964).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (1977).
98. 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
99. Id. at 2815.
100. Id.
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ernance rationale, the result would be the same as the Court’s decision in
Doe.
Because public significance is not always binary and may vary with
context, information may be “governance-related” only for certain situations. For example, the arrest records in Reporter’s Committee101 are of
public significance and thus clearly “governance-related” for purposes
of the justice system and public oversight, but are not necessarily “governance-related” when sought to be used outside the justice system in
combination with other information. Similarly, real property records are
of public significance for real estate transactions but not of public significance for the commercialization of innumerable products. Here, the
relationship to governance turns on the use of the publicly available
information for a purpose that has inherently public importance.
C. Complex Acts
Nuances in the distinction between private- and governance-related
acts play out in the United States v. Jones case.102 In Jones, the police
placed a tracking device on Jones’ car and recorded his movements on a
public street.103 The same information could have been obtained from
Jones’ cell phone provider or from street surveillance cameras.104 The
observable movement on a public street is a governance-related act—
observation indicates if the driver is observing traffic rules. This
moment of instant scrutiny is of public significance. However, the capture of the movements to profile the driver crosses into the private habits
and associations of the driver.105 The profile can reveal whether an individual visits a doctor, an unpopular political figure, or a family member.
The profile is not a “governance-related” compilation or an act of inherent public significance like the behavior of the petition signatories in
Doe v. Reed to get a measure on the ballot.106 This distinction goes to
the worry that Justice Sotomayor expressed in her concurrence in Jones
about aggregations of information.107
D.

First Amendment Considerations

The private-regarding/governance-related approaches raise three
101. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753
(1989).
102. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
103. Id. at 948.
104. Id. at 950.
105. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 295–96
(2004) (discussing privacy interests and road surveillance).
106. See 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010).
107. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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important First Amendment considerations that can be addressed by the
public significance metric. First, journalistic uses of information available in public are preserved. Newsworthiness will invariably take an
activity in public from a private matter to one of public significance. For
example, an individual’s photograph taken on a public street and used to
illustrate a news story would be considered “of public interest” just as
such uses are denied privacy tort protection.108
Second, direct recipients of private-regarding information could
still use the information. For example, someone on the street who overheard a pedestrian in conversation on a cell phone might be able to
repeat or report on what was overheard. While the cell phone conversation would ordinarily be considered a private matter and not one of public significance, the speaker is publicizing information to nearby
listeners and turning a private-regarding act into something of limited
public significance. Just as the privacy tort protection against publication
of private facts becomes unavailable when an individual publicizes otherwise private facts,109 here a private-regarding act can acquire some
public significance. The scope of the public interest, though, should be
constrained. For example, if the listener were recording the street conversation, the public significance would not justify posting the recording
to a popular website like YouTube for widespread dissemination or to
sell the recording.110
And, third, government surveillance would not be empowered. Private-regarding acts would be constitutionally protected as freedom of
association.111 At the same time, surveillance of governance-related acts,
like a public protest, would not be affected and would only be restricted
to the extent that the First Amendment protects anonymous political
activity.112
VI.

CONCLUSION

As information changes from obscure, to accessible, to transparent,
the United States will have to confront the disruptive impact of information technology on established approaches to privacy. At the moment,
108. See Ault v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 1988); Arrington v. N.Y.
Times Co., 434 N.E. 2d 1319, 1323–24 (N.Y. 1982).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (1977).
110. Note that this would not be the case if the speaker were a public figure in his or her own
right such as a politician.
111. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 458–62 (1958)
(holding that members of the NAACP may not be compelled to disclose their association with the
union to the State).
112. See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir.
2004) (upholding a New York statute limiting masked protest).
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the Supreme Court is poised to confront how it will deal with aggregations of information that are readily available from public observation
because of technology or, as Justice Sotomayor put it, our mundane
activities.113
Perhaps the clothing designer Carlton Yaito captured this new
sense of need in society when he described his new brand of clothing,
Privacy in Public: “The concept of Privacy In Public is based on you as
an individual. Put yourself in a situation where [you’re] surrounded by
dozens of people, suddenly you drift off into your own world. Not realizing everything around you. That is Privacy In Public.”114
In short, we must always recall Justice Stewart’s famous words in
Katz, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”115

113. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
114. About Privacy in Public, PRIVACY IN PUBLIC, http://privacyinpublic.com/about.php (last
visited Sept. 3, 2014).
115. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

